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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.	
10/701,083	11/05/2003	Doo-seop Eom	Q76216	6301	
23373	7590 06/06/2006		EXAM	INER	
	MION, PLLC YLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.		FIGUEROA	FIGUEROA, MARISOL	
SHITE SOO	LEVANIA AVENCE, N. W.		ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER	

DATE MAILED: 06/06/2006

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)
10/701,083	EOM ET AL.
Examiner	Art Unit
Marisol Figueroa	2617

	Marisoi Figueroa	2017	
The MAILING DATE of this communication app	ears on the cover sheet with the	correspondence add	ress
THE REPLY FILED <u>09 May 2006</u> FAILS TO PLACE THIS APF	PLICATION IN CONDITION FOR A	LLOWANCE.	•
I. The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or o this application, applicant must timely file one of the follo places the application in condition for allowance; (2) a N a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliar time periods:	wing replies: (1) an amendment, af otice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in	fidavit, or other evider compliance with 37 C	nce, which FR 41.31; or (3)
a) The period for reply expires 3 months from the mailing dat	e of the final rejection.		
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire	later than SIX MONTHS from the mailir	ng date of the final rejecti	on.
Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP	706.07(f).		
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date nave been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of eunder 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office late nay reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b) NOTICE OF APPEAL	xtension and the corresponding amount shortened statutory period for reply orig er than three months after the mailing d	of the fee. The appropr ginally set in the final Offi	iate extension fee ce action; or (2) as
2. The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in comfiling the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any extra a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed AMENDMENTS	ension thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	o avoid dismissal of th	
3. The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection,	but prior to the date of filing a brief	f, will <u>not</u> be entered b	ecause
(a) They raise new issues that would require further co	onsideration and/or search (see NC	TE below);	
(b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE bel	• •		
(c) They are not deemed to place the application in be appeal; and/or	etter form for appeal by materially re	educing or simplifying	the issues for
(d) They present additional claims without canceling a		jected claims.	
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a))			
1. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.		ompliant Amendment	(PTOL-324).
5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s		timely filed emendme	ent consoling the
 Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be a non-allowable claim(s). 	·	·	
7. For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) how the new or amended claims would be rejected is pro The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed:		ill be entered and an e	explanation of
Claim(s) objected to:			
Claim(s) rejected:			
Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE			
 The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, b because applicant failed to provide a showing of good at was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e). 			
The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessar	overcome all rejections under appe	eal and/or appellant fa	ils to provide a
0. The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanati	on of the status of the claims after e	entry is below or attacl	ned.
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER	ALL NOT I III II II II		
 The request for reconsideration has been considered b See Continuation Sheet. 	, , , ,		nce because:
12. Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s).13. Other:	(PTO/SB/08 or PTO-1449) Paper	No(s)	
			
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		LESTER G. KIN	CAID
		LESTER G. KIN	WEYAMBIER

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office PTOL-303 (Rev. 7-05)

SUPERVISORY PRIMARY EXAMINER

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:

Applicant's arguments filed on 5/9/2006 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.

In response to Applicant's argument that Davies does not teach or suggest "wherein the first communication device, when connection is established with the wireless communication device, transmits to the second communication device information on an address and a clock of the wireless communication device which are determined by the inquiry..." as recited in claim 1 (page 3, line 14 - page 4, lines 1-2 of the remarks).

The Examiner respectfully disagrees. Davies (US 6,816,730 B2) was used in combination with Melpignano (US 2003/0003912). Melpignano discloses wherein the first communication device (i.e. AP1) transmits information related to an address and a clock received from a mobile terminal to a second communication device (i.e. AP3, AP3) when the mobile terminal sends a handoff request (see p.0100-0101). Davies is used in combination to show that a first communication device (i.e. first beacon) that acquires information from a mobile terminal can transfer the acquired information to a second communication device (i.e. second beacon) when connection is established between the first communication device and the mobile terminal during an inquiry procedure (see col. 1, line 66-col. 2, lines 1-9). Therefore, the combination of Melpignano and Davies does teaches the limitations of claim 1.

In response to Applicant's argument that neither Melpignano nor Davies describes a hard hand-off process (page 4, line 3-9). However, it can be seen on paragraph 19 of Melpignano that a hard handoff occurs.

In response to the Melpignano describe an inquiry performed between the APs and the paging is carried out based on the clock offsets between the APs and in contrast claim 1 recites an inquiry between the first communication device and the wireless communication device (page 4, lines 10-16 of the remarks). However, Melpignano teaches that in a Bluetooth system slave units (i.e. wireless communication devices) reply to a master unit (i.e. first communication device/AP) and are found by a discovery/inquiry procedure (p.0060-0075). Furthermore teaches that when the mobile terminal sends a handoff request the access point 1 (i.e. first communication device) sends a page to its neighboring access points (i.e. second communication device) containing the address of the mobile terminal and information about the mobile terminal clock, and one person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that Bluetooth access points obtains this information about other Bluetooth devices (i.e. mobile terminals) in its range by an inquiry procedure.

In response to Applicant's argument that the Examiner has utilized impermissible hindsight reasoning in concluding that it is common knowledge in the art that a first communication device checks a connection state with a wireless device every predetermined period (page 4, lines 21-27).

In response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).

The Examiner asserts that it is well known in the art to check an status of a connection and paragraph 0013 of Cromer et al. (US 2004/0203818 A1) is evidence of the fact, that shows that it is common knowledge in the art for a communication device to check the status of a connection on a periodic basis